It is ironic that Fidel Castro, who is currently ostracized from the interAmerican system of states, has provided the impetus needed to overcome the obstacles that have for so long prevented agreement on the procedure for Hemispheric action regarding the recognition of de facto governments. Earlier attempts to formulate a common basis for the recognition of de facto governments have been very limited both in their scope and their success.
Dr. Carlos Tobar, the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, was one of the main proponents of a policy of automatic non-recognition of governments which came to power by revolution. This doctrine was incorporated into the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1907, 1 which was signed by the five Central American Eepublics. A Conference of the Central American Republics was held in Washington in 1923 and resulted in the signing of i Text of the treaty in 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 186; 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 229 (1908). another Treaty of Peace and Amity 2 which reiterated the provisions of the 1907 treaty in regard to non-recognition of governments coming to power through a coup or a revolution. Although the United States was not a party to the treaty, Secretary of State Kellogg stated in 1925 that United States policy with respect to the recognition of de facto governments in Central America was in full accord with the provisions of the treaty.
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The Tobar Doctrine received a severe blow when the treaty was denounced in 1932 by both Costa Eica and El Salvador. The United States, along with Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, extended recognition to the de facto Government of El Salvador that year, explaining that it was done in view of the denunciation of the treaty by El Salvador. 4 In contrast to the ill-fated Tobar Doctrine was the Estrada Doctrine. In 1930 the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Senor Estrada, put forward his doctrine which criticized the practice of recognition as an insulting practice that implies that judgment may be passed by other nations upon nations in which a coup or revolution takes place. Accordingly, Estrada announced that Mexico would simply maintain or withdraw its diplomatic agents as it deemed advisable concerning the governments in question. 0 Mexico, which had a long history of problems with the United States pertaining to recognition, hoped that other governments would adopt this practice. The advocates of this policy were to be bitterly disappointed, however.
A more comprehensive step was taken toward the development of an inter-American policy for the recognition of de facto governments as a result of the concern over subversive activities of Axis Powers in this Hemisphere during World War II. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Continent, meeting in Montevideo on December 24, 1943, adopted a resolution which recommended that the American Governments which had declared war on the Axis Powers, or had severed relations with them, withhold recognition from new governments instituted by irregular means until consultations among themselves could take place to determine whether the de facto government complied with the inter-American commitments for the defense of the Continent.
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Once consultations had taken place and information had been exchanged, each government could decide for itself whether or not the de facto government upheld the inter-American commitments to defend the Continent, and then proceed to recognition or not as each individual government deemed advisable. This procedure was to be used only for the duration of the war.
With the conclusion of the war, the need for an inter-American policy for the recognition of governments appeared to wane. Opinions were so varied at the First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, held 2Hackworth, op. cit. 188; 17 A.J.I.L. Supp. 117 (1923 The introduction of Communism into the Hemisphere in the form of Jacob Arbenz Guzman's government in Guatemala focused attention upon the desirability of a common course of action. The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas in March, 1954, adopted a resolution which condemned the activities of international Communism in Guatemala as "constituting intervention in American affairs." 10 In June of that year President Guzman was overthrown and an anti-Communist Junta led by Colonel Elfego Monzon gained control. The State Department extended recognition after Hemispheric consultations which were concerned primarily with the non-Communist character of the Junta, the fact that it exercised de facto control over the territory of Guatemala, and its assurances that it intended to uphold its international obligations.
The Charter of the Organization of American States declares that the solidarity of the American States requires the political organization of those states on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy. Communist penetration of Guatemala, it was argued, prevented the effective exercise of representative democracy. Others were convinced, however, that diplomatic pressures and policies, including recognition, amounted to intervention in the affairs of Guatemala which is condemned by the Charter. In view of the opposing convictions, further development of a Hemispheric policy languished once again.
The emergence of Fidel Castro in Cuba has been a factor of major importance in the development of an inter-American policy of recognition because of the apparent permanence of his Communist government and his attempts to export Communist revolutions to other Latin American countries. The United States, due to its position as leader of the "free world," has been most embarrassed by the existence of a Communist government so close to its shores, and has attempted to isolate Cuba.
By the Alliance for Progress President Kennedy hoped to alleviate the conditions in Latin America which encourage Castro-type revolutions. The Declaration to the Peoples of America, when the signatories pledged to improve and strengthen democratic institutions and to accelerate eco- nomic and social development, 11 primarily reflected the President's concern. The late President was so concerned for the development of effective constitutional government that he refused to recognize any de facto government in Latin America until it had indicated its intention to hold elections within a reasonable period.
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This requirement was added to the traditional requirements that a de facto government maintain effective control over the territory and exhibit a willingness to comply with the international obligations of the state.
During President Kennedy's Administration it became the invariable practice to consult other American Republics in the wake of a coup in the Hemisphere and to exchange information pertinent to the considerations involved in recognition. Considerable delay in acting upon the resolution was encountered because of the feeling of many that collective or collusive action in regard to recognition would amount to intervention in the affairs of the state in question, and this is explicitly prohibited by Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. However, in 1965, and as the result of American insistence, Resolution X X V I 1 5 was included in the Pinal Act of the Second Special Inter-American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in November of that year. The resolution provides for an informal procedure of consultation whenever the problem of the recognition of de facto governments arises. The preamble of the resolution states that the overthrow of a government and its replacement by a de facto government could be dangerous to the peace and solidarity of the Hemisphere. Therefore, the resolution was held to fall within the scope of Article 19 of the Charter which exempts "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security" from the prohibitions of Article 15.
The resolution recommended to the member states that, immediately after the overthrow of a government and its subsequent replacement by a de facto government, they begin an exchange of views on the situation. 13 Mr. Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in an interview with the writer in March, 1966 . " 4 7 Dept. of State Bulletin 539-541 (1962 . is Res. XXVI, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 17-30, 1965 , Final Act (Pan American Union, 1965 60 A.J.I.L. 460 (1966) .
Relevant factors to be considered include a consideration as to whether or not the overthrow of the government took place with the complicity and aid of a foreign government or its agents. This refers primarily to the problems created by Castro's international Communist aims in Latin America.
Also to be considered was whether or not the new government proposed to take steps to hold elections within a reasonable period, allowing its people the opportunity to freely participate in the elections. This was inserted at the urging of the American Rapporteur and was completely in agreement with the government's recent practice. Other criteria to be considered in the course of the consultations are: respect for the principles of the inter-American system, the Charter of Punta del Este, the Declaration to the Peoples of the Americas, and respect for human rights expressed in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
These considerations mentioned in the resolution are not requisites of recognition but they are conditions to be taken into account in the consultations. Once the consultations have taken place, each government will decide for itself whether or not it will extend recognition to the de facto government. While the resolution is voluntary and provides only for consultation, it also provides a basis upon which a certain amount of coordination can be achieved in the Hemisphere.
The resolution will remain in effect only until such time as the InterAmerican Council of Jurists prepares a draft statute on the recognition of de facto governments. The adoption of Resolution XXVI, by the very fact that it encourages the development of an inter-American policy of recognition, should facilitate the drafting of a statute by the Couneil of Jurists.
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A NEW INITIATIVE IN ASIAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT-LAWASIA
Legal development in the developing countries is at the same time one of the most urgent needs for modernization and one of the most delicate fields in which non-national organizations, private as well as public, can render assistance.
A comprehensive, unified, and depersonalized body of law, a welltrained and adequate legal profession, and an efficient system of judicial administration are necessary to the mobilization of human resources for national development, to the safeguarding of human rights, and to the orderly and impartial operation of government in the developing (and developed) countries. To participate fully in the international community and share in the benefits of international intercourse, economic and political, the developing countries require carefully developed bodies of law relating to commerce and banking, trade and investment, and the whole field of foreign relations. These countries are taking steps to hasten legal development, but many prefer to accept only very limited foreign assistance for this. Legal reform and development pertaining to the rights of citizens, their recourse to justice, their relations to each other and the
